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This thesis estimates the effect of Euro adoption on newest Eurozone members using 
synthetic control method. The effect is estimated on income per capita and GDP growth. 
Estimates indicate overall indecisive effect for Slovakia and Malta, neutral effect for 
Estonia and negative effect for Slovenia and Cyprus. The cost of Euro for Cyprus is 
estimated to be as high as 1/3 of GDP per capita. In some cases the direction of the 
effect changed before and after the financial crisis. The quality of inference suffers from 
low number of observations. Methodological assumptions are discussed, concluding 
that quality of Eastern European time series likely causes substantial bias in the results. 
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Abstrakt  
Tato práce odhaduje efekt zavedení Eura na nejnovější členy Eurozóny pomocí 
synthetic control metody. Efekt je odhadován na HDP per capita a na růstu HDP. 
Odhady ukazují celkově nerozhodný efekt pro Slovensko a Maltu, neutrální efekt pro 
Estonsko a negativní efekt pro Slovinsko a Kypr. Náklady zavedení Eura pro Kypr jsou 
odhadovány až do výše 1/3 HDP per capita. V některých případech se směr efektu 
změnil po finanční krizi. Rozhodnost závěrů je ovlivněna malým počtem pozorování. 
Práce diskutuje předpoklady použití metodologie se závěrem, že kvalita dat 
pravděpodobně výrazně zkresluje výsledky. 
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Estimating the Euro effect with Synthetic Control Method for Eastern Europe 
Motivation: 
Estimating the effect of Euro adoption is a very lively topic in European economics. Most 
countries that have adopted Euro already have sufficiently long time series for evaluation and 
quantitative estimates of Euro effect are pouring in. The most common method of estimation is 
differences-in-differences (DID) approach. Recently, estimation of average treatment effect 
using synthetic counterfactuals, so called synthetic control method, became very popular 
thanks to its simplicity. 
Synthetic control method (SCM) is supposed to systematically compare case studies and 
introduces quantitative inference in qualitative comparison. It has been introduced first in 
Abadie et al. (2003) to simulate effects of terrorism in Basque country. The method has since 
been applied to estimate: effect of anti-Tobacco program in California (Abadie et al. 2007), 
effects of inflation targeting (Lee 2011),effects of economic liberalization (Billmeier et. al 2012) 
capital controls in Brazil (Jinjarak et al., 2013), value of bank’s political connections in crisis 
(Acemoglu 2013), costs of German reunification (Abadie et al. 2014). Lately, the method has 
been applied to estimate effects of joining EU or Eurozone (for example Campos et al. 2014 or 
Aytug 2014) and lot more applications in this area are to be expected. 
The SCM is very simple, powerful and has many benefits over DID approach. It still rests on a 
number of assumptions though, that are often being violated.  
In this thesis I want to discuss SCM and the Euro adoption effect estimation for countries with 
only short time series available: Slovakia, Balkan countries, Baltics, Malta and Cyprus; and 
estimate the effects for those countries.  
Hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis #1: Significant change in GDP per capita can be attributed to Euro adoption 
for selected country. 
2. Hypothesis #2: The effect was positive for selected country. 
3. Hypothesis #3: During the crisis selected country performed better with Euro, than it 
would without it.  
Methodology: 
I am going to use synthetic control method, as implemented in Abadie et al. (2014). Synthetic 
control method is used to provide quantitative inference in small-sample comparative studies, 
as is the case with countries. The method constructs a synthetic counterfactual, which is then 
compared to development of the real variable over time. The difference between the two is then 
the effect of the event at some point in time. 
Significant advantage of the method over panel regressions with dummy variables lies in 
accounting for unobserved time varying factors affecting the outcome. The synthetic variable is 
constructed so that unobserved factors should be the same as in the real variable, if 
requirements (specified in Abadie et al., 2007) on the dataset are satisfied. One of the main 
requirements is sufficiently long time series. In case of rather young countries of Eastern 




addressed during the estimation.  
The computation itself is straightforward, the algorithm creates linear combination (weights) of 
countries which best corresponds to the country in focus. This is done on a pre-treatment 
period. After that we have a synthetic country which we can compare with the development of 
the real country. Two target variables will be considered GDP per capita, PPP and GDP growth 
rate. A range of growth predictors to estimate the country weights will be tested: measures of 
education, investment, trade openness, demography, inflation and productivity, labor market.  
The weights are estimated in such a way, that the root mean square error between the 
synthetically constructed variable and the real variable (GDP per capita/GDP growth) will be 
minimized. After the weights are estimated we can plot the real variable and the synthetic-
weighted one, where the synthetic should reflect what would be the real variable if the event 
(Euro in our case) never happened. The difference is the treatment effect. 
The data will be collected for publicly available IMF and WB databases. 
The credibility of the result can be confirmed using “placebo test”, that is, rerunning the model 
for different in/out-of-sample observations to confirm that resulting difference between synthetic 
and real variable really is due to the event; or rerunning the model for countries in the control 
group to confirm that the observed effect is unique to the country in focus. Statistical 
significance of the difference between the real and synthetic variable can be assessed with 
confidence intervals randomly drawn from the control group, as shown in Acemoglu et al. 
(2013). 
Expected Contribution: 
I will discuss the data requirements and assumptions of SCM in context of Eastern European 
countries and short time series. The SCM assumptions and data quality in the region are hard 
to reconcile. I want to find a suitable compromise based on economic intuition as well as 
statistical approach. 
Most of the current stream of synthetic matching and Euro effect estimation concentrates on 
Western Europe. I concentrate on Eastern Europe where many more countries are expected to 
adopt Euro, so the topic still has relevance for future policy. For the selected countries I will 
estimate the Euro effect on GDP per capita on the most recent data. 
Outline: 
1. Introduction: This section provides motivation for the thesis.  
2. Literature review for Euro effect: Here I collect estimates of Euro adoption effect for 
comparison.  
3. Methodology: In this section synthetic control methodology is discussed, the theory and 
applications. I will discuss the assumptions, interpretation of results and inference with 
placebo tests. 
4. Data: This section will go through selected Eastern European countries, SCM and Euro 
case by case. Then the variables will be discussed.  
5. Results: This section will cover the results from estimation. It will address country 
weights, variable fit and inference with placebo tests. 
6. Conclusions: Finally section will sum up the results for each estimated country and 
discuss the implications for countries about to join Eurozone. Implications for using 
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The common European currency has been a topic of academic and policy debate 
for a while now. Eurozone has grown from eleven members in 1999 to current nineteen. 
With the exception of Greece, all countries joining Eurozone later were those who 
joined EU during Eastern Enlargement in 2004. Countries still waiting to adopt Euro are 
from the same group. The discussion of costs and benefits of Euro adoption halted with 
the outbreak of financial crisis, followed by sovereign debt crisis. Euro adoption 
considerations of candidate countries were postponed at that time. Now the immediate 
concerns of financial crisis are over, Euro still stands and the question of whether the 
remaining EU countries should strive for Euro adoption is on the table again. Countries 
evaluating their Euro adoption stance now have the advantage of retrospective 
evaluation of Euro adoption effects. Such evaluation is typically approached within case 
study framework, comparing countries one-to-one, looking for differences between 
those who adopted Euro and those who did not. Verifying the effects with robust 
statistics is difficult due to small sample nature of the data. There are two reasons for 
this; first currency adoption in Europe is naturally not a commonly observed 
phenomenon; second the (mostly Eastern European) countries in focus have reliable 
time series starting only in 1990s. An attempt to overcome the small sample issues and 
introduce some quantitative inference into case studies, would be to employ methods 
with synthetic counterfactuals. These methods rely on construction of synthetic unit 
which mimics the real observed series up to certain intervention date, the difference 
between real and synthetic series after then is the estimated effect of the intervention. 
The approach is well suited for the task, since it has less strict requirements on the 
sample size.  
This thesis attempts to estimate the effects of Euro adoption on income per 
capita at purchasing power parity and growth rates using synthetic controls for Southern 
and Eastern European Euro adopters. An important part is discussion of the data 
requirements and applicability of synthetic control methodology, since the short series 
make deriving credible inference from the method a challenge. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 provides context to the 
estimation task. Section 3 reviews literature relevant for estimating currency adoption 
effects and synthetic control method. Section 4 provides overview of the synthetic 
control methodology, discusses its theoretical issues and implications for the 
application. Section 5 is a description of data availability and modelling dataset 
selection. Section 6 provides estimation results per country and discussion of the results. 
Section 7 concludes. Appendices hold tables and figures which are referenced to in the 




2 Background: Euro and new EU members 
Unlike EU members in 1999, later entrants vowed to adopt Euro at some future 
date. Of the thirteen countries who joined EU in 2000s, seven already adopted Euro. 
Table 1 provides overview of all relevant European countries and their relationship 
towards EU and Euro. 
 
Table 1: European countries and the Euro 
Country Joined EU Joined ERM II Adopted Euro note 
Albania                                    
Austria 1995                               1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Belgium 1957                               1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
                                pegged since 1999 peg to German Mark, later to Euro 
Bulgaria 2004                               pegged since 1999 peg to German Mark, later to Euro 
Croatia 2013                                 
policy of keeping exchange rate vis-
a-vis Euro stable until January 2015 
Cyprus 2004                               2008   
Czech Republic 2004                                   
Denmark 1973 1999 narrow ERM II since 1999   
Estonia 2004 2004 
pegged since 1992/1999, 
adopted 2011 
peg to German Mark, later to Euro 
Finland 1995                               1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
France 1957                               1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Germany 1957                               1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Greece 1981 1999 2001   
Hungary 2004                                  
Iceland                                    
Ireland 1973                              1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Italy 1957                              1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Kosovo                                2002 (unilaterally) peg to German Mark, later to Euro 
Latvia 2004 
                             pegged since 2005,    
adopted 2014 
peg to SDR, later to Euro 
Lithuania 2004 2004 
pegged since 2002,    
adopted 2015 
peg to US dollar, later to Euro 
Luxemburg 1957                              1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Macedonia                                    
Malta 2004 2005 2008   
Montenegro                                2002 (unilaterally) peg to German Mark, later to Euro 
Netherlands 1957                              1999   
Norway                                    
Poland 2004                                  
Portugal 1986                              1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Romania 2004                                  
Serbia                                    
Slovakia 2004 2005 2009   
Slovenia 2004 2004 2007   
Spain 1986                              1999 Euro as only currency since 2002 
Sweden 1995                                  
Switzerland                                    
Turkey                                    





This thesis focuses the newer Eurozone members, mostly from Eastern Europe. 
Lithuania and Latvia joined the Eurozone very recently are there is not much to evaluate 
yet. Countries which already have a few years of observations after Euro adoption are 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Malta and Cyprus. Each of those countries adopted Euro in 
different macroeconomic context and each country fared differently through the 
financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis later. 
 
 




Source: World Bank Database 
 
 
Slovakia adopted Euro in the wake of the crisis. Opinions as to whether it was a 




















































































































































































sources (see next section) are more skeptical. Slovenia’s Euro adoption was smooth 
with no controversies before or immediately after the adoption. Nonetheless in the 
following years, the country experienced prolonged recession (Figure 1) coupled with 
weakness in the (state involved) banking sector. Whether Euro is to blame is an open 
question towards which this thesis is trying to contribute. Estonian currency has been 
historically pegged to Euro and thus Euro adoption did affect the economy through 
exchange rate channel, but rather had effects relating to being member of a larger policy 
area. The adoption of Euro in the Baltic countries was delayed due to financial crisis 
and by the time Estonia got to introduce the common currency, it had already gone 
through severe recession (Figure 1) and real adjustment. Maltese growth remained 
stable throughout the observed period. The case of Cypriot Euro adoption coincided not 
only with financial crisis but also with substantial shift in government, Greek sovereign 
debt crisis and connected banking crisis. These effects are difficult to separate. 
 
 
Figure 2: Public poll asking “Having the Euro is a good or bad thing for your country?“ 
 
 Source: Eurobarometer1, October 2014 
 Note: Categories correspond to legend top-to-bottom 
 
 
There are two groups of prospective Eurozone members, the countries with 
currencies already pegged to Euro to some extent and countries which so far follow 
independent monetary policies. In the first group is Bulgaria and Croatia. In the second 
there is the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Romania. Bulgarian currency has 
been pegged to Euro since its introduction in 1999. Now the country satisfies all 
convergence criteria except for two year ERM II membership. It could potentially enter 
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the Eurozone as early as 2018. Croatian kuna has also been linked to Euro though not 
pegged at fixed rate. In January 2015 the country decided to follow Swiss Franc instead, 
due to large share of foreign denominated debt in the country. Croatia does not satisfy 
three of the convergence criteria (budget deficit, debt to GDP and ERM II membership. 
It is unclear when it might be able to join Eurozone. Although Czech Republic and 
Poland are able to fulfill the convergence criteria in a few years, there is little political 
will and strong public opposition against Euro adoption at the moment (Figure 3).  
Hungary is struggling with its government debt levels and is unlikely so satisfy the 
convergence criteria anytime soon. Romania may satisfy the nominal Maastricht criteria 
in the coming years, however it still lags in terms of real convergence.  
 
Figure 3: Public opinion on the consequences of introduction of the euro in the respondent country 
 
 Source: Eurobarometer, April 2014 
 Note: Categories correspond to legend top-to-bottom 





















3 Literature Review  
In this section the Euro effect is understood as direct economic implications of 
Euro adoption, may those be trade or welfare related. Most research so far relates to 
trade effects of Euro adoption, this thesis is concerned with welfare and growth effects 
of Euro adoption. The literature review section starts with general overview of currency 
union literature and literature on trade effects first, since these are most researched. 
Following sections review relevant literature on welfare and growth effects of Euro, 
applications of synthetic control methodology, estimates of effect of formation of EU 
itself and finally estimates of Euro related effects for the target countries. 
 
3.1 Monetary unions and trade effects 
The main theoretical reason for a common currency among European Union 
(EU) countries is the effect on the intra EU trade. This rests upon the idea of optimum 
currency area formulated in Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). 
However, the EU never fulfilled the listed criteria. Although the currency union may 
become optimum currency area endogenously - Frankel and Rose (1997 and 1998); 
there is also theory explaining why countries may diverge - Krugman (1993); and 
evidence indicates that indeed in some cases divergence is more likely Caporale et al. 
(2013). Thus the theoretical effects of the engineered common currency were unclear. 
There is consensus regarding the general costs and benefits of currency 
integration. Stable exchange rate environment and credible monetary policy facilitate 
low interest rates, increase in trade, competition and productivity and also income per 
capita growth. The long term costs relate to losing adjustment tool in the form of 
exchange rate, independent monetary policy stance and transmission of negative shocks 
throughout the monetary union. Despite agreement on the theoretical factors that affect 
costs and benefits of integration, there was less clear consensus on the practical effects 
of Euro introduction. While the discussion about costs and benefits was theoretical ex-
ante Euro adoption, as soon as there were some observed effects, the Euro effects could 
be empirically estimated. First often cited empirical work on currency unions came 
from Rose (2000)
2
, with staggeringly high estimated increase in trade flows among the 
currency union members. Barro and Tenreyro (2003) supported these results with 
estimation based on instrumental variables. Among the first attempts at the trade effects 
of European currency was one made by Micco et al. (2003), where the size of the effect 
was already in single digits. A comprehensive review of literature by Baldwin (2006) 
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also concludes that Euro effects cannot reach the magnitude estimated in the early 
literature. Most of the literature applied difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. This 
makes for a volume of comparable quantitative estimates of trade flow change in 
response to Euro adoption, which can be grasped meta-analytically. Havranek (2009) 
provides a quantitative overview of empirical literature at the time, concluding that most 
literature was marred with publication bias and - when accounted for these bias - the 
Euro effect was insignificant. 
 
3.2 Welfare effects of the Euro 
So far we discussed only the effect of Euro on trade flows. This effect can be 
modelled with gravity equations relatively with ease. Estimating the impact on growth 
and welfare is a path less travelled, though more interesting for the general audience. 
Frankel and Rose (2002) go in this direction, as they looked on income and not only 
trade with respect to currency adoption. There are estimates of what would the effect on 
welfare in Sweden, Denmark and UK be, had they adopted the common currency. Their 
per capita income was estimated to be 20% higher with Euro in this „Rosean“ stream of 
research. Carre and Collard (2003) use DSGE framework, finding benefits for 
households from positive technology and fiscal shocks under monetary union, compared 
to flexible exchange rates. Deverreux et al. (2003) use model based on sticky prices and 
conclude that common currency insulates countries from exchange rate volatility with 
positive welfare effects.  
One problem with estimating the “what-if” welfare scenarios is that growth (or 
GDP level) is subject to shocks that are not easily identified and modelled. One possible 
solution is the use of synthetic counterfactuals which already control for unobserved 
factors to some extent. The problem then shifts from controlling for all relevant factors 
to constructing good counterfactual. An elegant method of modelling counterfactuals is 
the Synthetic Control Method (SCM). 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
3.3 Literature using Synthetic Control Method 
The Synthetic Control Method is an econometric technique, designed for 
constructing synthetic counterfactuals for small samples. It works best when there is one 
single event in time that significantly affects only the treated unit and not the control 
units. The Synthetic Control Method was first used by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
to estimate the costs of terrorism in Basque country. Abadie, Diamond and 




program on tobacco consumption. Other applications were for example on the effects 
of: natural disaster on growth (Cavallo et al. 2010), inflation targeting (Lee 2011), 
economic liberalization (Billmeier et. al 2012), capital controls in Brazil (Jinjarak et al., 
2013), value of bank’s political connections in crisis (Acemoglu 2013), costs of German 
reunification (Abadie et al. 2014). The Synthetic Control Method is generally attractive 
for events that are observed very rarely and are specific to some well defined units 
(usually countries). In those cases traditional statistical inference techniques fall short, 
while SCM can deliver some quantitative estimates. Moreover, the simplicity makes 
estimation with SCM very easy to execute. 
Recently, applications of the SCM extended to the Euro effect. Aytug (2014) 
estimated average treatment effect of adopting the Euro on GDP growth for all 
Eurozone countries. His results are mixed, the costs/benefits differ among countries and 
between periods. In some countries the effect was opposite before and after the crisis. 
Overall the impact of Euro on growth was found negative. A new contribution by 
Gomis-Porqueras and Puzzello (2015) is an application of SCM on Euro adoption. 
Authors estimated effect of Euro on income per capita for Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands and Ireland. While the first four mentioned are estimated to have 
been better off without Euro, Irish income per capital would have been considerably 
lower. The effect on the Netherlands was estimated to be negligible.  
 
3.4 EU vs Euro effect 
An important distinction is between the effect of Euro and the EU itself. 
European economic integration is surprisingly a lot less empirically explored topic than 
trade effects of Euro adoption or trade liberalization in general
3
. What may be modelled 
as Euro effect may be in fact delayed effect of EU accession. This is particularly 
relevant for countries that joined the EU in 2004 and introduced Euro a few years later. 
Campos et al. (2014) estimated the effects of EU membership on GDP per capita and 
labour productivity for all EU members using SCM. They found strong evidence in 
favor of the integration. More specifically, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Portugal, Spain, 
Austria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia and Lithuania are supposed to be strong 
beneficiaries; Finland, Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia are the mild 
beneficiaries; the only loser from EU membership in terms of GDP per capita and labor 
productivity being Greece.  As for other estimates of the benefits of EU membership: 
Henrekson et al. (1997) found that EC and EFTA memberships do in fact have a 
positive and significant effect on economic growth, and that there is no significant 
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difference between EC and EFTA membership. According to Badinger (2005), EU 





3.5 Estimates of Euro adoption effects in selected countries  
This thesis estimates the welfare and growth effects of Euro for countries which 
adopted Euro later, but already have some number of observations after Euro adoption. 
Now, years after those countries adopted the common currency, there is still dearth of 
any ex post evaluation. A good source on estimates related to Euro and new Eurozone 
members are the central banks of the respective countries.
5
 National Bank of Poland 
staff investigated the trade effects of the euro adoption primarily for Slovakia, Slovenia 
secondarily for Malta and Cyprus in Cieslik et al. (2012). They used a gravity equation 
enriched by incomplete specialization assumption, which reflects the lower share of 
intra-industry trade of the Central European countries. Their results show that Eurozone 
accession did not stimulate bilateral exports, even depressed them in the case of Malta 
and Cyprus. Moreover, even the parameter for ERM-II is not found significant. These 
results contrast with the ex-ante estimates, like Fidrmuc et al. (2006) or Frankel (2008), 
which generally predicted positive effects of Euro adoption. Another Polish work, 
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2012) provides literature review of effect of Euro on various 
macroeconomic indicators, concluding that existing studies report no substantial effects 
of the euro. They then simulate a scenario of hypothetical Polish euro adoption in 2007. 
Under such scenario, Poland would have experienced substantial increase in volatility. 
Similar conclusions are reached in Torój et al. (2012), who perform a counterfactual 
exercise on Poland and Slovakia. They estimate that Polish tradable output would be by 
10-15% lower in 2009 with euro, while Slovak would be 20% higher without it. 
Aristovnik and Meze (2009) studied the ex post effect of the Eurozone creation 
for Slovenian trade. They argued that the trade benefits of the entry of new countries 
into the Eurozone would not be the same as the benefits of the initial formation of the 
Eurozone in the nineties. Their analysis showed that there had been a positive effect on 
Slovenia’s exports into and a negative effect on its imports from the Eurozone at the 
time of the creation of the Eurozone in 1999. However, they did not study the effects of 
2006 Slovenia accession to the Eurozone ex post. 
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 Badinger (2010) is a good introductory source on estimation of effects of post war European economic 
integration. 
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4 Synthetic Control Methodology 
This section reviews synthetic control method in general. It starts with 
motivation why and when to use SCM. Then the Synthetic Control Estimator is 
established, followed by discussion of data related assumptions behind SCM and bias 
stemming from violating those assumptions. Section concludes with discussion of 
inference techniques in applied synthetic control work. 
 
4.1 Motivation 
First use of the Synthetic Control Method is attributed to Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003), two later contributions co-authored by Abadie expanded and 
formalized the technique – ADH (2010) and Abadie et al. (2014). The motivation 
behind developing this methodology was to have some “qualitative inference with 
quantitative bones” - Tarrow (1995), that is, having comparable case studies, with 
precise methodology and some quantitative results. The question which should be 
answered by this methodology is: “What would be the development of target variable in 
time, if one single important event did not occur in past.” This has been traditionally the 
domain of difference-in-differences estimation. However, as we discuss in this section, 
there are cases where DID is not as suitable as SCM. The SCM approach to modelling 
“what-if” scenarios is through constructing a synthetic counterfactual, which is then 
simply compared to the observed series. The counterfactual is constructed as weighted 
average of units in the control sample. Those units should be structurally similar to the 
treated unit (borrowing the term from medical studies), with the only difference being 
some event (intervention) at a single point in time (such as terrorist attack, natural 
disaster or adoption of Euro). Choosing a set of proper control units is essential, as it is 
the only stage of estimation, where one can account for possible bias. From there on, the 
SCM is nothing more than clear algorithm how the weights of control units are 
calculated to get a synthetic match. Nonetheless, as Abadie et al. (2014) put it:  
“Formalizing the way comparison units are chosen not only represents a way of 
systematizing comparative case studies …, but it also has direct implications for 
inference.” and “... the main barrier to quantitative inference in comparative studies 
comes not from the small-sample nature of the data, but from the absence of an explicit 
mechanism that determines how comparison units are selected. By carefully specifying 
how units are selected for the comparison group, the synthetic control method opens the 
door to the possibility of precise quantitative inference in comparative case studies, 




The most pronounced advantage of synthetic control methods over regression 
based estimators is controlling for unobserved shocks affecting both control and treated 
units. The units in the (well chosen) control set should be theoretically affected by 
similar shocks as the treated unit. SCM weights in information which come after the 
intervention, regression techniques stop at the intervention date. SCM also does not 
require multiple observations of the intervention event, like regression techniques do. 
The biggest strength and weakness of the method is that it was created as 
empirical – to solve specific task of modelling counterfactuals. The formalism was 
subdued at first. The ADH (2010) paper set SCM on more solid footing formally. There 
are still assumptions (mostly data quality related) behind it that are not well described in 
most applications and application of the method requires ex ante analysis of those 
assumptions (which is not always the case in some papers). 
 
4.2 The Synthetic Control Estimator 
There are plenty of excellent formal summaries of synthetic control method, 
some with more formal style, such as ADH (2010) some less technical, such as Abadie 
(2013). The underlying formalism remains the same. Therefore we only provide brief 
formal overview of the method. An interested reader will find more information in the 
aforementioned papers and other SCM literature in the References section or in Annex 
to this thesis. 
Brief formal setup of synthetic control estimation goes as follows: Suppose we 
have J units, the first unit (j=1) being the treated one, i.e. the one which will experience 
intervention. The remaining J-1 units are the control group, unaffected by the 
intervention. Assume we have a total of T periods, split into T0 pre-intervention periods 
and T- T0 post-intervention periods. Now for each unit j and time t we observe outcome 
variable Yjt. For each unit j we also have observed vector of unit characteristics (X1j,…, 
Xkj). We define 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 as the outcome variable in case of no intervention. Then, for the 
affected unit j=1, with post-intervention periods 𝑡 ∊ [𝑇0 + 1, 𝑇], we are interested in the 
treatment effect in periods after intervention: 
 
















Now the problem is how do we get 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁, the outcome variable in the absence of 
intervention, the counterfactual outcome. We do this by creating synthetic equivalent of 
treated unit j=1, using the units j=2,…,J  in the control group. Each control unit will be 
assigned weight wj, so that the synthetic control estimator is a weighted combination of 
the control units: 
?̂?1𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑤2𝑌2𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽𝑌𝐽𝑡 
 
And the estimator of treatment effect is: 
 
 ?̂?1𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡 − ?̂?1𝑡
𝑁 (2) 
 
A feature of SCM is non-negative restriction of unit weights: 𝑤𝑗 ∊ [0,1], to avoid 







The restriction to non-negative weights can be relaxed, but the interpretability of the 
modelled counterfactual is one the advantages of SCM. 
What remains to solve is the procedure of obtaining the optimal weights. In ADH 
(2010) it is proposed to use the unit characteristics (X1j,…, X1k)  to calibrate the weights. 
We will be looking for a vector of weights w
*
, that will minimize the following metric:  
 
 









The weights v1,…, vk reflect the relative importance of the synthetic control reproducing 




of weights v1,…, vk. This is straightforward quadratic optimization problem. Now the 
question is how to choose the right combination of weights v1,…, vk. These weights 
represent the importance we place on variables that characterize each unit. Until now 
the estimation procedure has been rather simple, with not many possible deviations. 
Here may be a point of divergence where papers get different results based on how they 
approach this weight selection problem. 
In Abadie (2013) four approaches are described: 
1. Subjective setting of weights v1,…, vk. Researcher may have reasons for a 
specific vector of weights. 
2. Running a regression of the form: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑡𝛽 + 𝑡 , where relative 
predictive power of components 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑘 of vector 𝛽 will be used as 
weights. 
3. Choosing weights v1,…, vk  that produce the best fit in term how synthetic 
control tracks treated unit, measured by outcome variable during the pre-
intervention period. The task will be to minimize the pre-intervention 
prediction error: 𝑌1𝑡 − ?̂?1𝑡
𝑁 , over the whole period (i.e. MSPE). This adds 
a layer of computational complexity. (There is an option to enable this 
nested optimization in the Synth
6
 package – probably the most widely 
used script for SCM. This thesis uses this approach.)  
4. The last method assumes long pre-interventions time series, which can be 
split into training and testing samples. The weights would be estimated 
on the training sample the same way as in previous point. The mean 
square prediction error would then be validated on the testing sample. 
This process will iterate until MSPE on the testing sample is small 
enough. Then we take resulting weights v1,…, vk from the testing period 
and use it to calculate the final unit weights w
*
. (This approach is not 
used in this thesis, due to short time series.) 
Those were estimation setup related issues. Beyond that, differences in 
estimation results may stem from different optimization algorithms used by statistical 
packages. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. Interested reader will find more 
information on the optimization algorithms in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 
(2011), a paper dedicated to the Synth package, and in references contained therein. 
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This section collects assumptions listed in works applying synthetic control 
methodology. Although one declared advantage of SCM over DID is that SCM is 
identified under weaker assumptions, there are still conditions that should hold for SCM 
to be proper tool. An excellent starting point for discussing SCM assumptions would be 




1. Size of the intervention effect and volatility of the outcome 
 The estimated intervention effect has to be large enough not to be 
confused with other interventions 
 The effect should also still be sizeable given the volatility of the series on 
which it is measured 
2. Availability of a comparison group 
 There have to be enough units not affected by similar intervention8 
 Units affected by extreme, unique shocks should  be excluded9  
 Control units should have similar characteristics as the treated unit 
(measured by the predictor variables used in matching) 
3. No anticipation 
 Intervention date should be set in estimation to account for it being 
anticipated by forward looking agents (currency adoptions are usually 
well anticipated) 
 It may be useful to pre-date the intervention date in estimation to the 
moment when it was decided, rather than implemented 
4. No interference 
 Control units significantly indirectly affected by intervention in treated 
unit should be excluded (no spill-over effects) 
5. Convex hull condition  
 The treated unit characteristics have to fall in convex set of 
characteristics of the control units, see Figure 4  
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 Most of these are not unique to SCM, but also apply to DID or case study research design. 
8
 Obviously in case of Euro adoption, this restricts the control units to countries that did not adopt Euro, 
and are not even closely pegged to the currency, such as Denmark or Bulgaria. 
9




6. Time horizon 
 Effects of intervention may need time to fully demonstrate 




Figure 4 : Interpolation vs. extrapolation: The convex hull of X is the smallest convex set that contains 
the data. Inference on points inside the convex hull requires interpolation; inference outside it requires 
extrapolation. Source: King (2006) 
 
 
Violation of these assumptions does not always mean the method is infeasible 
for a given task: 
1. The first assumption is about the proper choice of outcome variable and 
intervention. The outcome variable should be something where treatment 
effect can demonstrate and the effect has to something distinct and 
irregular. If there is too much noise in the series, some of it may be 
filtered out to make the intervention effect more pronounced.   
2. The second assumption is most tricky one, as control sample heavily 
impacts the final results. It is not quite clear when the assumption 
satisfied. Both intuition and quantitative analysis should be employed 
during selection of control units. There will always a subjective input of 
the researcher. Using more quantitative approach may diminish the 
subjective bias, but sometimes at the cost of interpretability of weights 




3. Missing the beginning of the intervention effect diminishes the 
magnitude of the effect. If the synthetic was estimated on low number of 
observations (short series), then is also messes up the synthetic. So this 
assumption is more of a concern when there are only short time series 
available. 
4. Violating assumption 4 may be source of bias in the same direction as the 
treatment effect. Thus it exacerbates result, as opposed to violating 
Assumption 3, hence these two may cancel out. The “no inference” 
assumption contradicts the idea that controls should be similar to treated 
unit. In case of countries, the control countries will often be regionally 
clustered and will experience spillover effects. This bias can be mitigated 
by excluding large countries with significant spillover effect from the 
sample. 
5. Violation of assumption 5 is still manageable as long as the outlier 
variable is not the outcome variable. If the treated unit’s outcome 
variable lies outside the convex hull of controls, it cannot be 
approximated by interpolation. An easy remedy would be differentiation. 
For example a country whose GDP level cannot be approximated can be 
modelled based on GDP growth rates. 
6. Assumption 6 is there to make the conclusions we make about the 
treatment effect comprehensive and definite. It is more of an issue if the 
onset of the treatment effect is expected to be gradual. However its 
violation does not invalidate a partial result, though the “partial” status 
should be mentioned.    
 
4.4 Bias 
The synthetic control estimator is asymptotically unbiased in the sense that bias 
decrease with increasing number of pre-intervention observations. The formal proof is 
in Appendix B of ADH (2010). A practical implication is that short pre-intervention 
period makes the results biased; the more the shorter the series; when choosing data 
sources, the available series length should be the first concern.  
A common type of bias which may occur when using SCM is the interpolation 






 Although there may exist a linear combination of controls that matches the 
treated unit quantitatively well, it has no real world counterpart. Unfortunately this bias 
is commonly ignored in SCM applications. Data often does not provide sufficiently 
homogenous control group. The brute solution is to relax the requirements on similarity 
of control units to the treated one, use whatever matches well and accept the 
interpolation bias. See ADH (2010) p.495, for formalization of interpolation bias in 
SCM. An excellent overview of extreme counterfactual related issues is in King (2006). 
The interpolation bias is most severe regarding the outcome variable, nonetheless it may 
happen that a unit (say country) has some characteristic (say inflation) which is extreme 
compared to all units in control group. Such was the case in Abadie et al. (2014), where 
German price stability could not be matched by any country in the control sample. 
Authors argued that as long as the overall match is good, this minor issue can be 
ignored. However, as long as the only criterion is how closely the synthetic matches the 
observed in pre-intervention period, then it can always be arranged so that the resulting 
plots will look very intriguing, however the results will not be comparable across 
studies. If there is to be some use to the results in research, they have to be comparable 
and the more detailed is the description of the procedure leading to those results, the 
more credibility they have. Therefore the SCM is applied very conservatively in this 
thesis, with no aim to find a powerful synthetic match at all costs. Rather the goal is to 
discuss when the application to our task (estimation of Euro effect for Eastern European 
countries) is not smooth. 
So far many papers employing synthetic control methodology omit to present 
fulfillment status of all the mentioned assumptions or steps leading to the results: 
sample selection, data quality – missing observations and length of time series, 
discussion of interpolation bias, variable tests for hull convexity, optimization procedure 
used to acquire country weights, reporting country weights, running placebo tests for 
both the timing and the magnitude of the treatment effect. This illustrates that the 
methodology is not quite settled yet. 
 
4.5 Inference 
Perhaps the most challenging as aspect of Synthetic Control Method is 
confirming credibility of the results. Given the nature of most SCM applications – small 
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 For example if we would construct synthetic Germany with weights including Somalia on one end and 
Seychelles on the other, it is hard to reason why should Germany bear any similarities to those countries, 
let alone, lie “between” the two. Abadie et al. (2014) restricted their sample to OECD countries when 




samples, only one (or few) units affected by intervention – the standard inference 
techniques with standard deviations and confidence intervals are inapplicable here.  
There are two types of widely used tests, test that should help identify spurious 
results and falsification tests, which check underlying assumptions. The former group is 
represented by placebo tests. First application of placebo test is to confirm that the 
intervention date is unique. To conduct this test we can compute the synthetic control 
using simulated different intervention date. Then we observe if there is still noticeable 
deviation between out-of-sample synthetic match and real series after the real 
intervention date. If not, then the intervention date was truly special. This test is utilized 
in almost all SCM applications including ADH (2010) and Abadie et al. (2014). It is 
also employed by Campos et al. (2014) to look for anticipation effects, by predating 
EU-accession during the 2004 enlargement to 1998.  
Another simple measure that helps check good fit as well as intervention date 
and treatment effect magnitude is the ratio of post-intervention RMSPE to pre-
intervention RMSPE. Should the intervention effects be sizeable, the post-intervention 
RMSPE will be relatively large. If the synthetic matches well in the pre-intervention 
period, then pre-intervention RMSPE will be relatively small. Resulting ratio thus 
captures both quality of matching and magnitude of effect. Misplacing the split 
between, pre-intervention and post-intervention periods will also affect the ratio. Hence 
it is very intuitive scale-free metric which captures most important features of SCM. 
Second type of placebo tests, commonly deployed for SCM validation, is 
running the same estimation setting (same controls, same intervention date) for each of 
the control units. If the path produced by the synthetic unit in focus is unlikely to be 
reproduced by any control, then we can deem it significant. From the volume of 
placebos, pseudo p-values can be calculated. Intuitively it is the probability that given 
magnitude of treatment effect will be observed, measured by how many placebos 
reproduce the same magnitude treatment effect, more formal drawing of p-values is 
described in Cavallo et al. (2010). The thesis shows a formal way to calculate p-values 
of the treatment effect per period from the placebo results. This type of placebo tests 
implicitly assumes that the estimators follow the same distribution and are uncorrelated. 
In Abadie et al. (2014) this test is mentioned but not employed. It would have been 
interesting to see the test results, given that there likely was a correlation with the 
control group, as unification of Germany had spill-over effect on its neighbors.  
In general, even placebo tests rely on some large sample properties, which are 
absent in many small sample SCM applications. In synthetic control applications, the 
control sample is constructed conditional on the treated unit and may not be suitable for 




more than five times higher than the treated unit MSPE. Placebo studies for these units 
do not provide information to measure the relative rarity of the post-treatment gap 
obtained for the treated unit which was well-fitted prior to treatment (Abadie et al., 
2011). In such cases the aforementioned tests are not as good gauge for validity of the 
result. Hence it remains a question, how reliable can they be in each particular case. 
Second type of tests, falsification tests, aim at checking whether the intervention 
only had effect on the treated unit and not on controls. This is practically done using so 
called leave-one-out tests. That is, removing units from the control set one-by-one. If 
the unit weights change severely, in response to different composition of the control set, 
then their robustness is to be questioned. It means that the sample is either too small or 
that the synthetic depends excessively on one control unit. Same applies to the predictor 
variables, if slightly different set of variables yields very different resulting unit 
weights, then the quality of matching is a concern. These checks may also serve as an 
empirical guide when number of observations is too small. When this happens, the unit 
weights will become unstable and will swing excessively with changes in control 
sample. 
An elegant approach to inference with SCM is applied in Acemoglu et al. 
(2013). Their application of SCM gives them many treated units, which enables them to 
construct confidence intervals. They do so by bootstrapping 1000 random placebo 
treatment groups, each group the same size as the real treatment group, computing the 
treatment effect for each of those groups and constructing confidence intervals. 
Although, one should be aware that large sample properties upon which p-values 
depend, are absent in many case study applications. Some academic work, such as 
Acemoglu et al. (2013), Aytug (2014) or Campos et al. (2014), use multiple estimation 
techniques and the lack of statistical significance in SCM is compensated for with 
statistical significance in other (usually DID) approaches. Then SCM serves to get point 
estimates, while DID to establish significance. A very interesting approach is one opted 
for in Gomis-Porqueras and Puzzello (2015). They first run SCM to get estimates of the 
treatment effect, which is in turn used as an outcome variable in DID approach. This 
approach has great added value in relating the treatment effect components to specific 
economic factors and it also helps validate the significance of SCM results.     
This thesis employs mentioned weight robustness checks and RMSPE check for 
intervention date effects. Placebo tests with control group to derive pseudo p-values 
were not feasible, due to poor matching of most countries in the control samples. 
Inference for synthetic control methods is an inventive area of research as every other 





5 Data and Sample selection 
There is not much dispute over the synthetic control estimation procedure. It is 
simple and straightforward. The computational aspects of SCM applications do not 
change much. What differs across literature is data selection. Unfortunately, the choice 
of data may have more profound impact on the results than differences in methodology. 
In literature in many cases the section on data selection is very brief and it is impossible 
the reconstruct the same results just based on this information, as there was substantial 
unmentioned input by the researcher during data handling. This thesis attempts to 
follow a clear and detailed procedure of obtaining the control group and set of variables. 
This section discusses factors that played role in dataset composition. 
 
5.1 Length of period 
For the task outlined – estimation of treatment effect of Euro for selected 2004 
EU entrants – there are rather short series available. This is due to historical reasons. 
First off, many eastern European countries did not even exist in their current borders 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Baltic States, successors of Yugoslavia) 25 years ago. 
Second even the countries that have not changed in borders have the desired time series 
(such as national accounts) available in good quality only after 1990. This limits the 
maximal length of time series we can get to 1990-2013. This leaves us with about 16 to 
20 yearly pre-intervention observations and 3 to 7 post-intervention observations, 
depending on country. As discussed in the methodological section, having sufficient 
number observations is a priority, since quality of fit, magnitude of bias and credibility 
of inference all depend on it. Nevertheless, it is not clear how many observations is 
“enough”
11
. Numbers of observations in current synthetic control literature on similar 
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Abadie et al. (2014) 30 13 
Acemoglu et al. (2013) (daily stock prices) 250 100 
ADH (2010) 18 12 
Aytug (2014)  (21 periods in  total) 11-18 3-10 
Campos (2014)  (Eastern enlargement countries only) 11 4 
Gomis-Porqueras and Puzzello (2015)  24 12 
Jinjarak et al. (2013) 12 12 
 
 
Current literature of SCM is not united in when series are “long enough”. The 
most prominent source on synthetic control methodology, the ADH (2010) paper uses 
18 pre-intervention observations. From statistical perspective, this is low number. 
However the SCM is essentially about case studies where even small volume of 
observations may be reasonable. As for the post-intervention period Abadie et al. (2014) 
argue that approximately 10 years after German reunification is reasonably long period 
to observe the effects. As discussed in the methodological section (Assumption 6), this 
is more pressing issue when the treatment effect is expected to be gradual. It is likely 
the case of this thesis, since currency adoption effects take time to fully demonstrate and 
3 years of post-intervention observations in the Estonian case without doubt do not 
include the whole impact of Euro. In practice the number of observations depends on 
data availability. Rarely do researches have the luxury of having such long series, that 
they can decide where to start. Although in such circumstances the choice of beginning 
of pre-intervention period may affect the results. Setting the intervention date is also not 
straightforward if we want to account for anticipation effects. Campos et al. (2014) 
predated EU-accession during the 2004 enlargement to 1998, to account for anticipation 
effects. This however increases the danger of confounding intervention effects with 
other effects, arising between the official intervention date and pre-dated one. Due to 
these concerns and short series this thesis settled with official Euro adoption dates as 







5.2 Control group pre-selection 
Selection of set of controls that enter the estimations is the step with potentially 
the biggest impact on results. Current synthetic control literature on related topics serves 
as an inspiration: 
 Abadie et al. (2014) restrict the sample to OECD countries when 
modelling synthetic Germany. 
 Aytug (2014) included all candidate countries, potential candidate 
countries and EU members when estimating effect of Euro adoption on 
growth. 
 Campos et al. (2014) use a very large sample of countries from all around 
the world to estimate effects of EU membership on income.  
 Gomis-Porqueras and Puzzello (2015) estimate the effect of Euro 
adoption on income for six countries with a peculiar control group 
composed of Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, the UK, Norway, New 
Zealand, Singapore and USA. 
We see rather large geographical spread in the literature. It is reasonable to 
assume that countries like Bahrain and Barbados experience very different shocks and 
are structurally very different from European economies. Also, when we use SCM to 
model Euro adoption, it should be controlled for the effect of EU membership, which 
may be substantial. This is best done by including mostly EU countries in the control 
sample or countries with significant spill-over effects from EU economies. Herein 
treated countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Malta, Cyprus) arguably bear more 
similarities with other European countries than rest of the world. Thus as a starting 
point, all European countries, with population at least 100
 
thousand (and Turkey) are 
considered.   
All countries with the same intervention (Euro) should be excluded from 
estimation. Thus, all Eurozone members (apart from the countries of interest) are 
dropped from the dataset. Same applies to countries with currencies pegged to Euro and 
short time series. Next dropped are: Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro. 
Then there are countries with links to Euro, but good time series, namely: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Denmark and Baltic countries. The Baltic countries are a separate group. All 
three countries followed policy of currency stabilization through currency board since 
early 1990s. Lithuania chose peg to US dollar and later to Euro, Latvia pegged to SDR
12
 
first and Estonia pegged to German Mark. Both Lithuania and Latvia have been pegged 
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to Euro, since 2002 and 2005 respectively. Both introduced Euro in 2014/2015. An 
interesting counterfactual scenario would estimate the costs/benefits of Estonia adopting 
Euro three years ahead of its regional peers. So the three countries are only examined 
for that purpose. Croatian Kuna was left in the sample, despite being de facto pegged to 
Mark/Euro since its introduction. It was kept in a +/-6% fluctuation band which allowed 
some appreciation or depreciation. As of January 2015 it was decided that Kuna will be 
pegged to Swiss Franc for a while, so the peg to Euro is over. Bulgaria and Denmark 
provide dubious added value, are difficult to justify in the control sample and are thus 
left out. Other countries whose presence in the control sample is questionable are 
Iceland and Norway. Iceland is a specific island economy and Norway is a traditional 
outlier due to its oil income. As we discover later, these two countries may help satisfy 
convex hull condition, so for now these two countries stay in the sample. Table 3 
provides shortlist of countries in the sample. 
 
 
Table 3: Shortlist of countries, highlighted are treated countries 
Country Joined EU Joined ERM II Adopted Euro note 





policy of keeping exchange rate vis-a-vis 
Euro stable until January 2015 
Cyprus 2004   2008   
Czech Republic 2004 
  
  
Estonia 2004 2004 
pegged since 1992/1999, 
adopted 2011 
peg to German Mark, later to Euro 






Latvia 2004   
pegged since 2005,    
adopted 2014 
peg to SDR, later to Euro 
Lithuania 2004 2004 
pegged since 2002,    
adopted 2015 










Poland 2004  
  
Romania 2004  
  
Serbia        
Slovakia 2004 2005 2009   
Slovenia 2004 2004 2007   
Sweden 1995      
Switzerland       
Turkey       
United 
Kingdom 








Thus, at this stage there are 21 countries in the full sample. The sample is further 
divided into subsamples for comparison, there is a control sample – including only 16 
control units, Eastern European sample – including 11 countries and Western European 
Sample – including only 5 western controls (two EU members). Summary statistics for 
all sample groups is provided in Table 16 in Appendix A. 
What follows is a discussion of predictor variables which characterize the 
countries and relate to growth. After then, missing values and condition on hull 
convexity are briefly discussed and finally choice of final control groups will be 
explained. 
 
5.3 Variable selection 
Unlike control group selection, there is consensus about variables that should 
characterize the countries. This thesis does not deviate much from the rest of SCM 
literature on similar topics in variable selection. Two outcome variables are considered: 
GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, in international dollars
13
 (two 
possible sources) and GDP growth rate. The income per capita metric was also chosen 
by Abadie et al. (2014) and by Gomis-Porqueras and Puzzello (2015), in the latter case 
even for the same task – estimating effect of Euro adoption. Growth was chosen as 
outcome variable by Aytug (2014) for the exact same task, so the results can be directly 
compared. 
 
Predictor variables should characterize the economies. Nine variables are 
initially considered. Again, the same uncontroversial growth predictions as in the 
aforementioned papers are used: Investment rate, Secondary school enrolment, Share of 
industry value added and Trade openness ratio. Variable controlling for government 
finances - Government expenditure is a new addition. Another addition is variable 
controlling for demographic structure: Age dependency ratio. Since population growth 
rate is implicitly included in the per capita outcome, population growth variable is 
redundant. Because currency policy heavily impacts a country’s external balance, 
Current account balance is also included. Last addition is a traditional measure of 
development: Infant mortality rate. The reasoning for the last variable stems from high 
level of healthcare in Eastern Europe relative to income. The data sources are publicly 
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available WB and IMF databases.
14
 See Table 4 for detailed description of variables and 
sources. 
 
Table 4: Variable description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
GDP_pc_WB GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) WB 
GDP_pc_IMF GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2002 international $) IMF 
GDP_growth GDP growth (%) IMF 
School_enrol School enrollment, secondary (% gross) WB 
Industry_va Industry, value added (% of GDP) WB 
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) IMF/WB 
Trade Trade (% of GDP) WB 
Gov_exp General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WB 
Age_dep Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age population) WB 
Infant_mortality Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) WB 
Investment Total investment (% of GDP) IMF 
Current_account_balance Current account balance (% of GDP) IMF 
 
 
5.4 Missing values  
The dataset starts in 1990, many countries however have data available from a 
later date. Occasionally there are missing predictor values in the middle of the observed 
period. Statistical software usually handles missing outcome values in panel data by 
dropping the all observations in the period where an input of just one unit is missing. A 
balanced dataset is thus strongly desirable. Overview of missing values is provided in 
Appendix B, Tables 24-26. As apparent, former-Yugoslav countries have a high share 
of missing values in 1990s. They are candidates for being excluded from the dataset in 
case it conflicts with maximizing length of observed period. In the extreme case of 
Macedonia, information on investment share of GDP is completely missing. From 
periodical perspective, most missing values concentrate into the first five observation 
years, which corresponds to new countries emerging during that period. The dataset can 
be truncated to start later than 1990 to exclude poor quality data at the beginning, at the 
cost of series length. There are techniques to approximate the missing values (Schafer 
and Graham, 2002, provide overview of those techniques), however those techniques 
rely on large sample statistical properties and therefore are not applied here. 
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5.5 Hull convexity 
Appendix B provides information on violations of the convex hull assumption. 
Figures 17 and 18 compare how well do full control and East European Control sample 
cover the whole range of variable values of the treated units. Compared to East 
European controls, the treated units are on the rich end of the income spectrum which 
makes control sample restricted to Eastern Europe difficult if not impossible to use. 
Table 28 highlights treated countries and variables which lie outside the convex hull. 
Three treated countries – Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus - lie outside the convex hull of the 
Eastern European controls in terms of income per capita. This is a strong argument for 
inclusion of Western European countries in the control sample or using growth rates 
instead of GDP per capita levels as outcome variable for the three countries. No 
outcome variable lies outside the convex hull of Full sample, which means that 
Assumption 5 can be satisfied and all countries can be estimated. As for predictor 
variables, Trade Openness lies outside the convex hull in all cases for Estonia, Slovakia 
and Malta. This is due to export oriented nature of these economies. Other cases of 
unavoidable violation of hull convexity are: Malta-Share of industry value added, 
Slovenia-Age dependency ratio and Estonia-Share of investment to GDP. In all cases 
the values are higher than control sample. These were cases where hull convexity could 
not be improved by including Western European countries in the control sample. Apart 
from that there is a number hull convexity violations if the control sample is restricted 
only to Eastern Europe. Only Slovakia fits within the range provided by Eastern control 
sample, hence it can be modelled using only the tighter group of controls. 
   
5.6 Dataset composition 
Now we have a three-dimensional data selection problem: finding the optimal 
combination of countries, years and variables. This is a non-trivial task since in most 
cases we have to choose between number of countries in the control sample and number 
of variables or number of observations. The reason behind this is how SCM treats 
missing values. The algorithm averages all observations of one variable for a country, if 
there are no observations, there is no average. First, any missing value in the outcome 
variable renders that whole period (year in our case) across dataset useless. This means 
there is often a trade-off: including a country or including extra year of observations. 
Second, if a predictor variable is missing for all periods for any country it cannot be 
used. Third, if a predictor variable is missing for all countries in one period, that period 




matching, but it can be managed by specifying over which period the average should be 
calculated.    
In this thesis the problem is approached by constructing all meaningful 
combinations of countries, predictors and periods and picking one with sufficiently low 
RMSPE. There are two reasonable periods when to start the observation: 1992 and 
1995. This is given by data availability in Eastern Europe. It means increasing the 
potential number of datasets twofold. Then there is a conflict between Macedonia and 
Investment predictor, accounting for all combinations increases the number of potential 
datasets twofold again. Then there is the choice of Full control sample vs. Eastern 
Europe sample, however as we discussed in previous section on hull convexity, Eastern 
sample is only applicable in Slovak case. Lastly, there is selection of outcome variable. 
For most countries GDP per capita at PPP from World Bank source is the longest 
outcome series available and therefore it is preferred to IMF GDP per capita, PPP 
source. Growth rates are also estimated as outcome variable, so there are two possible 
outcome variables in each dataset. In total there are up to 2
4
=16 possible datasets for 
each treated country. In order to choose a good modelling dataset, three factors are 
considered (in this order of importance): 
1. restriction to smaller sub-sample (Eastern Europe, Baltics) to reduce 
interpolation bias if possible  
2. maximum number of observation periods, countries and predictors 
possible 
3. minimum RMPSE ratio 
The third is a quantitative measure. Each dataset produces pre-intervention 
RMSPE. In order to compare the RMSPEs across different outcome variables, a ratio of 
the pre-intervention RMSPE to average of pre-intervention outcome variable is 
calculated. The order of importance reflects intuitive reasoning in the first place, data 
quality with respect to requirements of SMC in the second and goodness of fit in the 
third. This is of course at author’s discretion and is thus subject to bias, however it 






Overview of estimated country weights is presented in Tables 5 and 6 at the 
beginning of the section.  Country specific inference and discussion of results is 
presented per country in the rest of the section. For each country first predictors are 
reported, then estimated country weights with robustness checks and finally the 
synthetic series. Whenever possible both income per capita and growth were estimated. 
Whenever weights of given treated country are sufficiently robust to control sample 
composition, leave-one-out check for stability of treatment effect is performed (Figures 
14-16 in Appendix A). 
 
 
Table 5: Country weights where outcome variable is GDP per capita  
Outcome variable: Income per capita 
Controls\Treated Slovakia Slovenia Malta Cyprus 
Albania 0 0 0 0.264 
Croatia - 0.032 - - 
Czech Republic 0.299 0.558 0 0 
Hungary 0.246 0.2 0 0 
Iceland - - 0 0 
Latvia - - - - 
Lithuania - - - - 
Macedonia 0 - - - 
Norway - - 0.19 0 
Poland 0.117 0 0.714 0 
Romania 0.338 0 0 0 
Serbia - - - - 
Sweden - 0.209 0 0 
Switzerland - 0 0.039 0.128 
Turkey - - 0.057 0 


















Table 6: Country weights where outcome variables are growth rates 
Outcome variable : GDP growth 
Controls\Treated Slovakia Slovenia Estonia (only Baltics) Cyprus 
Albania 0 0 - 0.261 
Croatia - 0 - 0 
Czech Republic 0.226 - - - 
Hungary 0.004 0.433 - 0.362 
Iceland - - - 0 
Latvia - - 0.827 - 
Lithuania - - 0.173 - 
Macedonia 0.267 0 - 0 
Norway - - - 0 
Poland 0.333 0.542 - 0 
Romania 0.17 0.025 - 0 
Serbia - - - - 
Sweden - 0 - 0.14 
Switzerland - 0 - 0.237 
Turkey - 0 - 0 




In the case of Slovak income per capita matching, control sample restricted to 
Eastern Europe was sufficient for a good match. Predictor variable averages of the 
observed series are close to synthetic, exceptions being trade and inflation (Table 17 in 
Appendix A). Slovakia’s trade openness as strongly export oriented economy could not 
be reproduced with the control group. Inflation of the synthetic stands out due to 
relatively high weights of Romania and Hungary – two countries with high inflation in 
the 1990s.  
Country weights are reported in Tables 5 and 6. The weights are rather evenly 
divided among the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Romania when income is the 
outcome variable. When growth series are being matched, weight of Hungary is 
replaced by Macedonia. In both cases, weight of Hungary is not robust, it drops to zero 
when the control sample is restricted to countries with positive weights, as visible from 
Tables 7 and 8. The robustness of Macedonian weights in growth matching is also low, 
it drops to zero when Romania is left out, see Table 8. Polish and Czech weights are 
stable when other control units are removed. Hence it is feasible to construct synthetic 




Eastern European sample, most are EU members and should be subject to similar 
shocks.  
 
Table 7: Synthetic weights for combinations of control countries, Slovakia, Income 
Slovakia, Income matching 
Combinations of control countries 
Poland Czech Republic Romania Hungary 
0.549 0.357 0.094 0 
Poland Czech Republic 
  0.673 0.327     
Note: In each row country with the lowest weight (in the rightmost column) is removed, sometimes 
weights change even if the removed country had zero weight. Same applies to all following weight tables. 
 
 
Table 8: Synthetic weights for combinations of control countries, Slovakia, Growth 
Slovakia, Growth matching 
Combinations of control countries 
Poland Czech Republic Macedonia, FYR Romania Hungary 
0.211 0.411 0.277 0.101 0 
Poland Czech Republic Macedonia, FYR Romania 
 0.221 0.391 0.348 0.039 
 Poland Czech Republic      
0.599 0.401      
 
 
Real and synthetic series are presented in Figures 5 and 6. Vertical dashed lines 
indicate EU entry and the end of pre-treatment period for official Euro adoption. 
Slovakia started diverging from its synthetic control as early as 2004 – the EU entry 
year. This is confirmed by RMSPE test, Table 22 in Appendix A reports the post-
intervention to pre-intervention ratio of RMSPE for the official Euro adoption year and 
for 2004. There is no sizeable difference between the two for neither income nor 
growth. This means we cannot attribute the post-intervention (post 2008) gap between 






















In the crisis years synthetic Slovakia performed better than real Slovakia. This 
would be a case against prevailing public opinion in the Slovak Republic – which holds 
that Euro helped stabilize economy during the crisis. On the contrary, the result is in 
line with Torój (2012) DSGE counterfactual simulation, where Slovak exports were 














































































































































(2013), Slovakia fixed its exchange rate to Euro at rather over-appreciated value. This 
forced internal devaluation to restore external competitiveness, which may be the reason 
for the hefty decline in income and growth in the first years, compared to synthetic. 
However after the crisis, real Slovakia rebounded much faster than its synthetic 
counterpart. It is unclear however how much of this growth can be attributed to Euro 
and how much to structural changes during the crisis. Compared to Aytug (2014), who 
also estimated growth effect with the same methodology, this thesis arrived at different 
weights, but similar synthetic growth series. 
 
6.2 Slovenia 
Matching Slovene income per capita requires inclusion of Western European 
countries in the control sample to account for hull convexity. In our case Sweden took 
the positive weight. Predictor averages are well matched by the synthetic, the only 
outlier being current account balance as percentage of GDP. The averages are reported 
in Table 18 in Appendix A. Table 5 reports country weights for income matching. The 
biggest donor with 0.558 weight is the Czech Republic, Sweden and Hungary weight 
about 0.2 and Croatia has small weight of 0.032. Table 9 reports robustness check. 
Robustness of all weights is very low, reducing the sample changes weight composition 
substantially. Hence we can make no conclusions based on income matching alone. 
 
 
Table 9: Synthetic weights for combinations of control countries, Slovenia, Income 
Slovenia, Income matching 
Combinations of control countries 
Czech Republic Sweden Croatia Hungary 
0.609 0.223 0.168 0 
 
Sweden Croatia 
   0.363 0.637   
 
 
When the outcome variable is growth, the synthetic can be composed of 
countries from the same region. Table 6 reports the full sample weights, Table 10 
reports weights for countries with positive weight. In both cases Poland and Hungary 
are about equally important donors (0.542 and 0.433 respectively), Romania 
complementing (0.025). The weights are robust to changes in the control sample. 
Matching growth series is more reliable in the Slovene case than matching income, and 






Table 10: Synthetic weights for combinations of control countries, Slovenia, Growth 
Slovenia, Growth matching 
Combinations of control countries 
Poland Hungary Romania 
0.542 0.433 0.025 
Poland Hungary   




The real and synthetic income series are plotted in Figure 7. There is visible 
difference between synthetic and real Slovenia after Euro adoption, although RMSPE 
check is inconclusive (Table 22 in Appendix A). Slovenia outperformed its synthetic in 
the pre-crisis years, but suffered more during the crisis and was outpaced by the 
synthetic afterwards. The result is unreliable due to the low robustness of weights. 
 
 




Real and synthetic growth series are plotted in Figure 8. It tells the same story as 
income. Slovenia outperformed pre-crisis, but declined more severely during the crisis 
and started lagging afterwards compared to synthetic control; compared to income 
matching with very different (and more robust) composition of the synthetic. Leaving 
one control country out does not invalide the result (Figures 14 and 15 in Appendix A). 
Compared to Aytug (2014), the post-intervention gap between synthetic and real growth 
series is bigger, the weight composition also differs as in Aytug’s paper Iceland weights 

























































































Estonian currency had been pegged to Euro until 2011, when the country joined 
Eurozone. Latvia adopted Euro four years later and Lithuania year after that in 2015. All 
three countries followed a policy of stabilizing their currencies by pegging to 
Mark/Euro in Estonian case, US dollar in Lithuanian and SDR in case of Latvia. In 
2004 Estonia and Lithuania joined ERM II, Latvia followed in 2005 (maintaining very 
narrow +/-1% ER band). The three countries are economically very similar and are thus 
suitable for case study comparisons. Here synthetic Estonia is created using the other 
two countries’ series until 2011. First purpose of this little exercise is to derive weights 
as measure of similarity to the control countries; second is to estimate the effect of 
introducing Euro three years ahead of the other two countries. 
Estimating income proved to be technically difficult, so only growth matching is 
presented. Table 19 in Appendix A reports predictor averages, as expected the sample is 
rather homogenous. Synthetic Estonian weights were estimated as 0.827 for Lithuania 
and 0.173 for Latvia. So in terms of growth rates the country arguably bears more 
similarity with Lithuania. The quality of matching Estonian growth with the regional 
peers is rather good since all three countries are exposed to the same shocks. Figure 9 



































































synthetic and real series in the post-intervention years 2011-2013, compared to pre-
intervention years. 
 






Malta is a very specific economy and difficult to match synthetically. Synthetic 
income series weight Poland heavily, followed by Norway, Turkey and Switzerland. All 
these countries arguably bear few similarities to Maltese economy and the interpolation 
bias is likely to be strong in this match. While weights are rather robust to control 
sample selection (Table 11), the fit itself is very poor (Figure 10). We cannot infer any 
conclusions from these results. 
 
Table 11: Synthetic weights for combinations of control countries, Malta, Income 
Malta, Income matching 
Combinations of control countries 
Poland Norway Turkey Switzerland 
0.582 0.135 0.173 0.11 
Poland Norway Turkey 
 0.707 0.222 0.071 
 Poland Norway 
  0.78 0.22 











































































Cyprus is an island economy with a number of structural differences from the 
control group. A number of predictors are not well matched by the control group (Table 
21 in Appendix A). The estimated weights put Cypriot income between Albania, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom (Table 5) and are robust to control group selection 
(Table 12). This is obviously strong interpolation, nonetheless the income series is 
matched well by the synthetic (Figure 11) and robust to weigh changes (Figure 16 in 
Appendix A). Growth series matching is less robust to control group selection (Table 




Table 12: Synthetic weights for combinations of control countries, Cyprus, Income 
Cyprus, Income matching 
Combinations of control countries 
United Kingdom Albania Switzerland 
0.48 0.312 0.208 
United Kingdom Albania   





















































































Table 13: Synthetic weights for combinations of control countries, Cyprus, Growth 
Cyprus, Growth matching 
Combinations of control countries 
Sweden Albania Hungary Switzerland 
0.841 0.159 0 0 
 
 
There is visible divergence of the real and synthetic Cyprus since 2009 in both 
income and growth (Figure 12). Although it is not confirmed by RMSPE check (Table 
22 in Appendix A) due to short series. The cumulative difference between real and 
synthetic Cypriot income per capita in is -9012 (2011 international dollars), over the 
2008-2013 period. This was about 33% of GDP per capita of Cyprus in 2013. In the 
case of Cyprus the post-2008 underperformance may also be explained by bad 
government policy over the past five years. Orphanides (2014) identifies government 
approach to public finances and banking system as the most significant contributor to 
Cypriot decline. Whether or not that was the case, we do not find strong case for Euro in 
Cyprus with synthetic control approach. 
 
































































































Aytug (2014) also estimated growth with SCM and arrived at similar weight 
composition and a plot similar to Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13: Cyprus vs. Synthetic Cyprus, Growth 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                              































































































































































                                                                                                                                                              
6.6 Results summary 
Results per country and outcome variable are summarized in Table 14. 
Estimated weights and intervention effects are more conclusive for Slovenia and 
Cyprus, less for Slovakia and indecisive for Malta due to poor matching. Estonia was 
only matched with two countries (Lithuania, Latvia) so robustness is not an issue. 
   
 
Table 14: Summary of estimation results 






Estimated Euro effect 
 
during crisis after crisis 
Slovakia income low high negative positive 
Slovakia growth low low inconclusive inconclusive 
Slovenia income low high negative negative 
Slovenia growth high high negative negative 
Estonia (only Baltics) growth high high - neutral 
Malta income high low inconclusive inconclusive 
Cyprus income high high neutral negative 
Cyprus growth low high neutral negative 
 
 
Table 15 reviews results from literature on similar topics which also applied 
synthetic control method. Comparability with this thesis is limited as Campos et al. 
(2014) studied different effect and Aytug (2014) only used data until 2011, which 
effectively means only 3-4 years of post-intervention observations. Aytug has the same 
direction of the effect for Slovenia (negative) and Malta (indecisive with very poor 
match quality). His estimated effect on Slovakia is neutral, also rather similar to result 
of this thesis. For Cyprus the estimated effect is opposite (positive) of this thesis 
(negative). However, in this thesis the divergence between Cypriot real and synthetic 
series develops after 2010 and in Aytug (2014) the observation period was limited by 










Table 15: Comparison of results in similar literature 
Source and estimated effect Country Estimated effect 
Campos et al. (2014): Effect of EU 
entry on GDP 
Slovakia mild positive 
Slovenia strong positive 
Estonia  strong positive 
Malta - 
Cyprus - 
Aytug (2014): Effect of Euro 
adoption on GDP growth (only until 









6.7 Further research opportunities 
Future methodological research may focus on establishing a formal framework 
for measuring bias of synthetic control estimators and finding minimal threshold for 
length of observation period. A meta-analytical work in this field would be beneficial. 
When the volume of literature on similar topics using synthetic controls builds up, it 
will be interesting to see comparison of synthetic weights estimated for each country. 
Supporting insufficient inference from synthetic counterfactuals with other empirical 
techniques would help validate the results. Lastly, when more post-intervention 
observations are available it will be interesting to extend the estimated results to get 







First task of this thesis was to review synthetic control methodology and its 
applicability for the case of short eastern European time series. The available time series 
are generally deficient in length, nonetheless they allow for good matching in some 
cases. Compared to other synthetic control literature the number of yearly observations 
from first available data to Euro introduction is on the low end. Despite the fact, some 
countries can be matched acceptably within their regional control group, satisfying most 
assumptions of the synthetic controls. However the inference techniques commonly 
used with synthetic control still succumb to the small sample and short series and often 
do not provide meaningful inference. It may improve with longer post-intervention 
series over time though.   
Treatment effect of Euro adoption was estimated for Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Malta and Cyprus on GDP per capita at PPP and GDP growth rate. The estimated 
results are to be interpreted with caution due to often low robustness of estimated 
synthetic weights and due to short post-intervention series. In case of Slovakia and 
Slovenia the synthetic counterparts experienced stronger decline than the real countries 
during the crisis years, indicating that Slovakia and Slovenia might have been better-off 
without Euro during the crisis. In Slovak case the post crisis recovery was stronger than 
that of synthetic match, in Slovene case the opposite was observed. However, this may 
be result of structural changes in the economies during the crisis, rather than effect of 
Euro. Note also that significance of the intervention date for Slovakia was invalidated 
by RMSPE check. Estonia was compared to Lithuania and Latvia during 2011-2013. 
There was no significant effect on growth when the country adopted Euro relative to its 
peers. As for the Mediterranean islands, Maltese match was insufficient for inference, 
Cyprus declined severely after crisis, whereas synthetic Cyprus kept growing after brief 
decline in 2009, although at a slower pace. The cumulative difference of the real and 
synthetic Cypriot GDP per capita at PPP over the period 2008-2013 was about (minus) 
9,000 international dollars or 33% of Cypriot GDP per capita in 2013. However the 
Euro effect is inseparable from the effects of banking crisis and government policy in 
Cyprus and real costs of Euro may thus be significantly lower. 
Overall the estimated effects of Euro adoption were neutral to negative for 
selected countries, and hence support the stream of literature critical of the immediate 
economic benefits of Euro adoption for new EU members. The decisiveness of results 
was adversely affected by data quality however. Prospective Eurozone members might 
reconsider timing of Euro adoption. For countries already pegged to the common 




independent, floating currencies might face higher costs than benefits over the short 




8 Appendix A 
 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics summary 
  Control sample Western Europe Sample Eastern Europe sample Full sample 
Variable # observations Mean Std. Dev. # observations Mean Std. Dev. # observations Mean Std. Dev. # observations Mean Std. Dev. 
GDP_pc_WB 373 23 283.39 15 106.65 120 42 146.10 10 689.71 361 16 924.80 6 910.43 481 23 217.01 13 546.18 
GDP_pc_IMF 354 20 105.61 13 471.62 120 34 714.18 11 985.89 336 14 929.57 7 181.25 456 20 136.04 12 313.00 
GDP_growth 354 2.46 4.60 120 2.14 2.39 332 2.83 5.04 452 2.65 4.50 
School_enrol 340 94.48 14.93 112 106.97 13.91 333 89.59 10.52 445 93.97 13.71 
Industry_va 346 30.74 6.30 112 29.60 5.39 331 31.86 7.31 443 31.29 6.94 
Inflation 364 23.00 94.39 120 2.71 2.62 354 24.65 95.60 474 19.10 83.15 
Trade 369 80.89 28.04 120 74.97 17.74 354 97.57 37.74 474 91.85 35.20 
Gov_exp 368 18.27 4.99 120 19.93 5.03 353 17.91 4.19 473 18.42 4.50 
Age_dep 384 30.06 8.07 120 29.01 3.85 384 29.68 8.50 504 29.52 7.66 
Infant_mortality 384 11.25 9.48 120 4.14 1.36 384 12.20 9.02 504 10.28 8.61 
Investment 338 21.96 5.40 120 20.03 3.76 325 23.46 5.86 445 22.54 5.59 









Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic 
school_enrol 89.40235 89.39442 89.71964 89.72435 
industry_va 36.11017 35.90399 36.05521 34.16385 
inflation 6.925867 27.88393 6.194846 9.897847 
trade 128.285 86.07387 131.3439 84.42341 
gov_exp 20.11232 17.04535 19.31887 17.43319 
age_dep 28.89602 25.77239 26.71634 26.71235 
infant_mortality 10.43529 13.11487 9.515385 11.08662 
current_account_balance -5.875812 -5.475783 -7.341231 -5.229602 
 
 




Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic 
school_enrol 92.65533 99.83935 93.08907 96.44668 
industry_va 34.97011 34.71549 34.97011 32.67015 
inflation 9.818071 9.65995 9.818071 13.82263 
trade 103.924 90.91054 103.924 79.14346 
gov_exp 18.32331 21.80575 18.32331 20.24254 
age_dep 23.69636 25.57222 23.3256 27.32781 
infant_mortality 5.06 6.8746 4.871429 9.920893 
investment 25.34733 25.32575 - - 










school_enrol 100.2093 96.96836 
industry_va 29.05482 24.9676 
inflation 6.149733 5.735809 
trade 124.9817 102.0616 
gov_exp 18.84443 20.09818 
age_dep 25.09145 24.83153 
infant_mortality 7.253333 12.01185 
investment 31.06087 26.39814 
current_account_balance -8.274667 -8.282932 
 
 





school_enrol 83.80854 98.97835 
industry_va 45.90733 33.75532 
inflation 2.765529 15.74228 
trade 169.65 60.54457 
gov_exp 19.09148 19.09809 
age_dep 30.87989 30.8755 
infant_mortality 7.329412 9.980141 
investment 20.64092 20.80476 
current_account_balance -6.2 -0.614721 
 
 




Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic 
school_enrol 91.65524 91.64991 95.24391 93.83234 
industry_va 21.17262 25.57952 20.50901 27.31941 
inflation 3.237176 8.806132 2.8994 8.50242 
trade 102.0494 59.42835 101.3709 87.94598 
gov_exp 17.26969 15.88638 17.07263 17.04044 
age_dep 33.79125 33.45984 33.08015 31.20414 
infant_mortality 6.264706 10.65831 5.833333 11.27689 
investment 21.14335 19.61358 - - 






Figure 14: Leave-one-out weight robustness check, Slovenia, Income 
 




Figure 15: Leave-one-out weight robustness check, Slovenia, Growth 






















































































































































Figure 16: Leave-one-out weight robustness check, Cyprus, Income 
 






Table 22: Ratio of post-intervention to pre-intervention RMSPE for different intervention dates 
  Intervention year 
  Outcome variable 2004 Euro adoption year 
Slovakia income 3.20 3.06 
Slovakia growth 0.89 0.72 
Slovenia income 1.41 1.63 
Slovenia growth 3.14 3.79 
Estonia (only Baltics) growth 1.05 0.94 
Malta income 2.80 2.26 
Cyprus income 4.42 4.51 




















































































9 Appendix B (Data quality) 
Table 23: Data availability  
 
GDP_pc_WB GDP_pc_IMF GDP_growth School_enrol Industry_va Inflation Trade Gov_exp Age_dep Infant_mortality Investment Current_account_balance 
Albania 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2008 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
Croatia 
1995-2013 1992-2013 1993-2013 1993-2003 1995-2013 1993-2013 1995-2013 1995-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 
   
2005-2012 
        
Cyprus 
1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-1997 1990-2008 1990-2013 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
   
1999-2012 
        
Czech Republic 1990-2013 1995-2013 1996-2013 1990-2013 1993-2013 1994-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1995-2013 1995-2013 
Estonia 
1995-2013 1993-2013 1994-2013 1990-1996 1995-2013 1993-2013 1995-2013 1995-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1993-2013 1993-2013 
   
1998-2012 
        
Hungary 
1991-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-1992 1995-2013 1990-2013 1991-2013 1991-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
   
1994-2013 
        
Iceland 
1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-1996 1997-2012 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
   
1998-2011 
        
Latvia 1990-2013 1992-2013 1993-2013 1990-2012 1990-2013 1992-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 
Lithuania 1990-2013 1999-2013 1996-2013 1990-2012 1990-2013 1993-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1995-2013 1995-2013 
Macedonia 
1990-2013 1992-2013 1993-2013 1993-2005 1990-2013 1993-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
 
1992-2013 
   
2007-2010 
        
   
2012 
        
Malta 
1990-2013 2000-2013 1990-2013 2001-2008 1990-2010 1990-2013 1990-2011 1990-2011 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
   
2010-2012 
        
Norway 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2012 1995-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
Poland 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2012 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
Romania 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2012 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
Serbia 1995-2013 2000-2013 1999-2013 1999-2012 1995-2012 1995-2013 1995-2013 1995-2012 1990-2013 1990-2013 1998-2013 2000-2013 
Slovakia 1992-2013 1993-2013 1994-2013 1993-2012 1995-2013 1994-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1993-2013 1993-2013 
Slovenia 
1995-2013 1992-2013 1993-2013 1993-1999 1995-2013 1993-2013 1995-2013 1995-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 
   
2004-2012 
        
Sweden 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2012 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
Switzerland 
1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-1996 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
   
1998-2012 
        
Turkey 
1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-1995 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 
   
1997 
        
   
1999-2012 
        
United Kingdom 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2012 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 1990-2013 




Table 24: Missing values by predictor 
Predictor  Count Missing Missing % 
 School_enrol 445 59 11.7% 
 Industry_va 443 61 12.1% 
 Inflation 474 30 6.0% 
 Trade 474 30 6.0% 
 Gov_exp 473 31 6.2% 
 Age_dep 504 0 0.0% 
 Infant_mortality 504 0 0.0% 
 Investment 445 59 11.7% 
 Current_account_balance 465 39 7.7% 




Table 25: Left – predictor missing values by Country, Right – predictor missing values by year 
Country Count Missing Missing % 
 
Year Count Missing Missing % 
Albania 211 5 2.3% 
 
1990 137 52 24.1% 
Croatia 189 27 12.5% 
 
1991 139 50 23.1% 
Cyprus 203 13 6.0% 
 
1992 147 42 19.4% 
Czech Republic 198 18 8.3% 
 
1993 159 30 13.9% 
Estonia 190 26 12.0% 
 
1994 162 27 12.5% 
Hungary 207 9 4.2% 
 
1995 184 5 2.3% 
Iceland 205 11 5.1% 
 
1996 183 6 2.8% 
Latvia 202 14 6.5% 
 
1997 182 7 3.2% 
Lithuania 195 21 9.7% 
 
1998 184 5 2.3% 
Macedonia, FYR 181 35 16.2% 
 
1999 187 2 0.9% 
Malta 197 19 8.8% 
 
2000 187 2 0.9% 
Norway 215 1 0.5% 
 
2001 187 2 0.9% 
Poland 210 6 2.8% 
 
2002 187 2 0.9% 
Romania 215 1 0.5% 
 
2003 187 2 0.9% 
Serbia 166 50 23.1% 
 
2004 187 2 0.9% 
Slovak Republic 197 19 8.8% 
 
2005 188 1 0.5% 
Slovenia 189 27 12.5% 
 
2006 187 2 0.9% 
Sweden 215 1 0.5% 
 
2007 188 1 0.5% 
Switzerland 214 2 0.9% 
 
2008 188 1 0.5% 
Turkey 213 3 1.4% 
 
2009 185 4 1.9% 
United Kingdom 215 1 0.5% 
 
2010 186 3 1.4% 
total 4227 309 6.8% 
 
2011 180 9 4.2% 
     
2012 174 15 6.9% 
     
2013 152 37 17.1% 
     




Table 26: Outcome variable missing values 
Predictor Count Missing Missing % 
 GDP_pc_WB 481 23 4.6% 
 GDP_pc_IMF 456 48 9.5% 







Figure 17: Distributions of treated units relative to Full sample 
 
Note: Histograms show the distribution of full sample (white line), overlaid with the distribution of 
treated sample (grey area). If the whole width of grey area is within the plot, it can be fitted. The more 













Figure 18: Distributions of treated units relative to East sample 
 
Note: Histograms show the distribution of East European sample (white line), overlaid with the 
distribution of treated sample (grey area). If the whole width of grey area is within the plot, it can be 




Table 27: Variable averages and boundaries, Full sample 




Albania 6208 5480 2.9 71.8 20.9 20.1 66.5 11.8 44.7 22.6 25.4 -7.0 
Croatia 17890 14828 2.1 89.5 28.9 79.8 78.4 20.3 25.2 6.9 22.4 -3.7 
Czech Republic 22886 20243 2.4 92.3 37.8 4.3 103.2 20.1 24.1 6.3 27.7 -3.5 
Hungary 19191 16113 0.9 94.7 31.0 12.5 119.1 22.3 24.6 9.5 22.7 -4.5 
Iceland 34756 29447 2.4 106.9 26.3 5.1 76.2 22.5 34.9 3.1 20.1 -6.8 
Latvia 14236 13035 3.4 95.1 27.5 23.1 101.7 18.8 26.0 13.6 25.0 -4.5 
Lithuania 15734 17065 4.6 97.5 33.0 28.6 111.2 19.4 28.0 9.7 21.6 -6.5 
Macedonia, FYR 9302 8457 1.7 80.0 31.3 25.1 99.7 19.5 31.5 16.1   -5.3 
Norway 56759 47942 2.5 113.4 37.8 2.2 71.4 21.2 29.7 3.9 22.2 9.7 
Poland 15489 13212 3.3 96.7 33.4 37.3 63.7 19.4 28.0 8.7 20.9 -3.4 
Romania 12892 10707 1.2 84.5 39.8 58.6 68.0 9.5 26.5 21.1 24.8 -5.8 
Serbia 9983 9701 2.3 90.3 30.8 28.0 63.6 20.2 29.5 11.9 18.3 -8.9 
Sweden 37248 29910 2.1 118.5 29.4 2.2 76.2 25.5 27.6 3.5 18.2 4.2 
Switzerland 49185 39790 1.5 96.5 27.8 1.4 97.0 11.1 24.5 4.7 22.8 9.1 
Turkey 13928 11831 4.2 74.8 30.1 43.1 46.0 12.6 48.0 32.9 20.8 -2.9 
United Kingdom 32782 26482 2.2 99.2 25.5 2.7 54.1 19.3 28.3 5.5 16.9 -1.9 
min  6 208 5 480 0.9 71.8 20.9 1.4 46.0 9.5 24.1 3.1 16.9 -8.9 






Table 28: Variable averages, Treated countries 




Cyprus 27450 23804 3.1 91.2 21.3 3.1 100.8 17.5 31.8 5.6 20.5 -5.0 
Estonia 18969 15997 4.3 101.2 29.2 12.9 131.4 19.2 26.8 8.6 30.2 -6.5 
Malta 23942 25038 1.8 85.3 44.7 2.7 169.9 19.3 29.0 7.0 19.8 -5.3 
Slovak Republic 18656 16487 4.3 90.1 35.8 5.7 131.4 19.9 28.1 10.0 26.3 -4.7 
Slovenia 25181 20939 2.8 93.7 34.0 7.4 114.8 18.8 23.2 4.7 25.1 -0.3 
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This part arrives at the formal relationship between estimator bias and length of 
observation period.  
Suppose we have J units, the first unit (j=1) being the treated one, i.e. the one which 
will experience intervention. The remaining J-1 units are the control group, unaffected 
by the intervention. Assume we have a total of T periods, split into T0 pre-intervention 
periods and T- T0 post-intervention periods. Now for each unit j=1,…,J and time 
t=1,..,T , we observe outcome variable Yjt. For each unit j we also have observed vector 
of unit characteristics (X1j,…, Xkj). We define 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 as the outcome variable in case of no 
intervention. Then, for the affected unit j=1, with post-intervention periods 𝑡 ∊ [𝑇0 +
1, 𝑇], we are interested in the treatment effect in periods after intervention: 
 
 𝛼1𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡 − 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 (1) 
 
Now we need to get 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁. Abadie et al. (2010) use following factor model: 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡𝛧𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡, (2) 
 
where 𝛿𝑡 is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units (time 
effect), 𝛧𝑖 is a vector of observed pre-intervention covariates, 𝜃𝑡 is a vector of unknown 
parameters,  𝜆𝑡 is a vector of observed common factors, 𝜇𝑖 is a vector of permanent 
unknown factor loadings and 𝑖𝑡 are observed transitory shocks at the unit level with 
zero mean and independent. Suppose a vector of weights 𝑤 = (𝑤2, … 𝑤𝐽), where 
𝑤𝑗 ∊ [0,1] and ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽





= 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝛧𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=2
+ 𝜆𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜇𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=2





Suppose there are weights that satisfy following conditions: 

















𝑗=2 = 𝑍1.   
  
 












Abadie et al. (2010) in their Appendix B prove that bias of this estimator is bounded by 
a term which decreases with length of observation period: 
 
 













Where 𝑚 is maximum over average error per unit 𝑗 , ?̅? the variance of those errors, β 
stands for a group of coefficients (see the original paper for detailed description) and 𝑝 
is a some even constant. What we can see from the right hand side part of equation (5) 
is that bias will decrease with increasing number of observations at a decreasing rate. 
Table and Figure bellow approximate the decrease in bias with increasing length 
observation period. In this simulated exercise, the minimal threshold for effective 






Table: Approximate bias multiplier due to number of observations 
T Decrease in bias (1/T) Decrease in bias (1/T
1/2
) 
1 1.000 1.000 
2 0.500 0.707 
3 0.333 0.577 
4 0.250 0.500 
5 0.200 0.447 
6 0.167 0.408 
7 0.143 0.378 
8 0.125 0.354 
9 0.111 0.333 
10 0.100 0.316 
11 0.091 0.302 
12 0.083 0.289 
13 0.077 0.277 
14 0.071 0.267 
15 0.067 0.258 
16 0.063 0.250 
17 0.059 0.243 
18 0.056 0.236 
19 0.053 0.229 
20 0.050 0.224 
21 0.048 0.218 
22 0.045 0.213 
23 0.043 0.209 
24 0.042 0.204 
25 0.040 0.200 
26 0.038 0.196 
27 0.037 0.192 
28 0.036 0.189 
29 0.034 0.186 
30 0.033 0.183 
31 0.032 0.180 
32 0.031 0.177 
33 0.030 0.174 
34 0.029 0.171 
35 0.029 0.169 
36 0.028 0.167 
37 0.027 0.164 
38 0.026 0.162 
39 0.026 0.160 
40 0.025 0.158 
41 0.024 0.156 
42 0.024 0.154 
43 0.023 0.152 
44 0.023 0.151 
45 0.022 0.149 
46 0.022 0.147 
47 0.021 0.146 
48 0.021 0.144 
49 0.020 0.143 





Figure: Approximate bias multiplier due to number of observations 
 




















































Nmuber of pre-intervention observations 
